I. Introduction
With renewed energy, suggestions are being made that the very highest courts that sit in the United Kingdom -the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council -need to be reformed. Because of the apparently different problems faced by each court, a sharp distinction has almost invariably been made between these two 'top courts' in political debate and academic study. For the Appellate Committee, the principal concerns are about the appropriateness of the court being part of the legislature, the role of the Lord Chancellor as a judge of the court, the mechanism of appointment to the court, and how the court will cope with the expected increase and new demands of litigation under the Human Rights Act 1998.' In relation to the Judicial Committee, the main contentious issue is whether it is still proper for a court sitting in London to hear appeals from independent or self-governing states overseas, especially where local courts have imposed the death penalty.'
For several reasons, however, it is no longer possible to separate discussion of the two courts. First, day to day work of the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (the permanent, salaried judges w h o hear almost all appeals in both top courts) is now divided equally between both institution^.^ Because of the common membership of the two courts, anxiety about the growing case load of one court necessarily prompts questions about the Law Lords' capacity to fulfil their roles in the other; and reform of one court will have a n impact o n the manpower of the other. Secondly, it is now clearly wrong to characterise the Judicial ' The assistance of Roger Masterman LLM and Neil Duncan LLB is gratefully acknowledged, as is the help of the Privy Council Office. An earlier draft of this paper was discussed at a seminar held at the School of Public Policy, UCL at which we benefited from the discussion.
' For recent studies, see Brice Dickson and Paul Carmichael (eds), The House of Lords: its Parliamenta y and Judicial Roles (Oxford, 1999) and David Robertson, Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords (Oxford, 1998) . 2 See e.g. David Paru~ick, 'End this nonsense of our hanging judges', The Times, 15 June 1999; Sir Louis Blom-Cooper, 'Caribbean appeal court', The Times, 21 June 1999 (letter to the editor).; Stephen Vasciannie, 'Revisiting the Privy Council', The Jamaica Gleaner, 12 July 1999. 3 The statistic cited by Lord Hope of Craighead, 'Taking the case to London-is it all over?' [I9981 J.R. 135 at 144 and Lord Goff of Chieveley, written evidence to the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Futtrre, Cm. 4534 (London, 2000) . The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary also carry out other judicial or quasi-judicial functions, e.g. chairing public inquiries, sitting in the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and acting as Visitor to some universities in England. On the problems such additional activities create, see David Bamber, 'Justice delayed by a shortage of Law Lords', Sunday Telegraph, 9 January 2000.
Committee as principally an 'overseas' court: its jurisdiction has recently been expanded to 'devolution issues', which include points relating to the Human Rights Act 1998 and European Community law;4 and in some fields (notably appeals from certain professional bodies), it is the final court of appeal in the United Kingdom. Thirdly, any reform of top level courts needs to consider combining the functions of the Appellate and Judicial committees into a single court -or the creation of a separate constitutional court which would take on some of the functions of both existing top courts.
"cotland Act 1998, s. 33 and Sched. 6; Government of Wales Act 1998, s. 109; Northern Ireland Act 1998, SS. 79-83.
Second appeals -constitutional right or effectiveness?
Before any sensible inquiry is possible into the future role, institutional structure, procedures or composition of either or both of the top courts, we need to be clear about what is, or ought to be, valuable about them. This attempt to clarify what is beneficial about the work of the top courts is not, of course, to imply that they are not needed -though, in the past, this has been a d~o c a t e d .~ The straightforward answer to the question posed in the title of this essay is that the top courts hear appeals from intermediate courts of appeal; in almost every matter they deal with, the top courts are a 'third1 court hearing a second a~p e a l .~ In Access to Justice, Lord Woolf suggested that, generally, appeals serve two main purposes: the private purpose of doing justice in particular cases by correcting wrong decisions; and the public purpose of ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice by making such corrections and clarifying and developing the law and establishing precedents.7 He was here describing the function of first appeals; in relation to the top courts, the question is more precisely about the worth of second appeal^.^ There are two main modes of justification for 'third courts': that constitutional principle requires the possibility of a second appeal; and that three tier arrangements exist because they are conducive to the effectiveness and efficiency of the legal system.9 "ee Lord Gardiner, 'The Administration of Justice', ch. 2 in Gerald Gardiner and Andrew Martin (eds.), Law Reforin Now (London, 1963) , p. 16; Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1873.
Exceptions to this are that: 'devolution issues' may be determined by the Judicial Committee on 'references' from lower courts and law officers; appeals from statutory bodies responsible for the regulation of certain professions are also 'first' level appeals to that court; a little used provision 'that it shall be lawful for His Majesty to refer to the said Judicial Committee for Hearing and Consideration any such other Matters whatsoever as His Majesty shall think fit, and such Committee shall thereupon hear or consider the same, and shall advise His Majesty thereon in the manner aforesaid' (Judicial Committee Act 1833, s. 4); and there is provision for 'leapfrog' appeals to the Appellate Committee from first instance trials (Administration of Justice Act 1969, s. 12) .
Access to Justice -Afinal report (London, 1996) , ch. 14, para. 2. 8 In other jurisdictions, courts at or near the apex of the legal system, especially 'constitutional courts', do not necessarily have an appellate function; detailed comparative analysis falls outside the scope of this paper.
Other justifications are possible: a conservative plea that legitimacy rests on traditional authority and 'why fix what ain't broke?'; and in relation to the Judicial Committee, debates about its future role as the court of final appeal for overseas jurisdictions are influenced by pragmatic concerns to maintain the death penalty or to avoid 'tribalism' in the appointment of judges to a successor court (on which see Vasciannie, n. 2 above). It should be noted that jurisdictions which have ceased to send appeals to the Judicial Committee have often created a national third court to replace it.
Constitutional Principle
Access to a court is a fundamental right -recognised by English law," the European Convention on Human Rights," other international rights instrurnent~,'~ and by the basic laws and codified constitutions of many states. Perhaps, then, second appeals may be justified on the basis that they take such a right of access to a court seriously? Certainly, the right to one appeal has been recognised as of constitutional importance. Protocol 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights requires the opportunity for criminal convictions and sentences to be reviewed by a higher court;I3 and a Recommendation of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers has 'agreed that appeal procedures should also be available for civil and commercial cases and not only for criminal case^'.'^ But the Council of Europe Recommendation is a document urging restraint: it encourages restrictions in the form of leave requirements for civil appeals and, though acknowledging that some legal systems allow second appeals, is not encouraging of their use. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to make out a constitutional rights case for second appeals for people in the United Kingdom. Long-established practice also stands against it: those convicted of criminal offences in Scotland have never had a right of second appeal to the Appellate Committee;" and recent legislation in England and Wales also seeks to limit the use of second appeals. 16 The position of people outside the United Kingdom is different. One of the significant functions of the Judicial Committee is to provide adjudication services to several independent states, to the United Kingdom's Overseas Territories and the Crown ~e~e n d e n c i e s . "
In most of these jurisdictions, the right to appeal to the Judicial Committee is either formally part of an entrenched written constit~tion,'~ or may be regarded as a fundamental law.19 Decisions as to whether these jurisdictions cease to use the Judicial Committee as their court of final appeal are ultimately conditioned by claims to national self-determination,'" which the United Kingdom government has, of course, always respected -or even encouraged -in this context."
Efficiency and effectiveness
Although (to the extent just described) the justification for a second appeal has a constitutional rights-based aspect, its rationale rests more solidly on the perceived utilitarian benefits which a 'third' court confers on the operation of the legal system it serves. The purpose of this paper is to identify what these benefits may be, and to hold them up for critical examination. While most other aspects of the United Kingdom's legal systems have in recent years been subject to thorough-going efficiency reviews, there has as yet been no attempt to achieve 'joined up and strategic' approaches to the top courts themselves or their relationships with the broader legal systems they serve. The
Modevnising Government White Paper puts such approaches at the centre of the government's programme of 'renewal and reform':22
'Although there are areas, such as foreign and security policy, where effective co-ordination and collaboration are the norm, in general too little effort has gone into making sure that policies are devised and delivered in a consistent and effective way across institutional boundaries for example between different government Departments, and between central and local government. ...
Policies too often take the form of incremental change to existing systems, rather than new ideas that take the long-term view and cut across organisational boundaries to get to the root of a problem.'
Anyone searching for an example of a field of governance in which institutional boundaries encourage an absence of joined up thinking need look no further than the top courts. (London, 1998) ; the Bowman report on the Crown Office (London, April 2000) . 29 In December 1999, Auld L.J. was appointed to conduct a review of all aspects of the criminal justice system, following a National Audit Office report revealing delays, inefficiency and E85m a year waste in the system. 30 A House for the Future (n. 3, above), ch. 9.
Ill. What is valuable about the top courts' work?
Our theme, then, is that the judicial functions of the Privy Council and House of Lords must be considered together; and that justifications for the existence of second appeals (the vast bulk of the top courts' current work) must largely lie in the practical benefits which such appeals provide. In the remainder of this essay, we seek to survey what these benefits may be. Among legal practitioners, judges in the United Kingdom and abroad, and members of the government there appears to be a broad consensus that the Law Lords perform valuable work. Perhaps because of this, thinking about the point and value of second appeals in the United Kingdom is still curiously under-developed; people sometimes appear to believe we should have a second appeal because second level appeals are ~aluable.~' Put in this stark way, however, the proposition is tautologous. The questions which it begs (why are second level appeals valuable? What would be lost to the legal system if the second level appeals did not exist? Why only two, not more, opportunities to appeal?) require careful answers. Several desirable attributes or consequences of the top courts' work can be identified.
They provide 'better quality' adjudication.
They determine important cases.
They correct errors made by first level appeal courts in the application of law.
They manage precedent.
They are constitutional courts.
r They provide a court of final appeal for all three of the UK's legal systems. They manage the operation of the legal system.
They have authority to innovate to ensure law resonates with contemporary social values.
They provide adjudication services for overseas jurisdictions. r (Oddly), they provide first appeals from certain professional discipline tribunals.
Many of these tasks contribute to achieving a broad function of high level appeals -that of facilitating ' j o i n e d -~~~'~~ justice and law through the co-ordination, in various ways, of laws and procedures.
We assess, in turn, the tasks said to be carried out by the top courts. In doing so, we draw on the evidence provided by a sample of cases from the top courts: judgments handed down between November 1996 and November 1999.~~ Our aim is to identify and clarify the 31 The seminal work is Louis Blom-Cooper and Gavin Drewry, Final Appeal (Oxford, 1972 arguments, not to carry out a cost-benefit analysis -though in this regard it should be noted that the financial costs of running the top courts are modest.34
Better quality adjudication
Though rarely p u t so bluntly, many of the desiderata for third courts are connected to ideas that their processes and outputs are, simply, 'better' than those of the courts below. This may come about in several different ways -through the refinement of legal issues, the mode of deliberation; style of the written judgments; or the composition of the court.
Refinement
As Lord Clyde recently remarked, 'It is often found that during the history of a case through successive appeals the arguments become narrowed and refined' (though he went o n to a d d that 'The present proceedings are a n exception to that. The various presentations appear to have lurched from one argument to another so as to give rise to a suspicion about the basic stability of the case').35 The claim here is that the very process of preparing for a further hearing, and arguing the points again, is useful to the parties' lawyers and the court ' of final appeal benefits from the reasoned judgments of the courts below it (and, accordingly, questions of law are 'better' determined).
In several respects, the ideal of progressive distillation of argument may not always be completely achieved. Occasionally wholly new arguments, not canvassed i n the courts desirable for appeals to be determined 'on the basis of actual facts found at trial not on hypothetical facts assumed (possibly wrongly) to be true for the purpose of the strike Further, 'leapfrog' appeals brought under the Administration of Justice Act 1969 directly from first instance judgments turn the Appellate Committee into a court of first appeal; few such appeals are, however, b r o~g h t .~' It should also be noted that the Judicial Committee when dealing with a reference from a law officer as to the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament" will not benefit from any prior 'refinement' of the legal issues.
These instances aside, the opportunity for 'refinement' seems present in most of the cases which come before the top courts. But in and of itself this factor cannot provide a compelling justification for second appeals. It is no more than the application of the common place observation that, normally, the more time a group of people devote to completing a task, the better the outcome (or the better the justification for the outcome).
Furthermore, the 'refinement' justification does not itself explain why some (only a tiny number) of cases should benefit from such careful and costly consideration. Council from that jurisdiction be abolished, said that 'the proposition that a two appeal system will produce ... a better of articulation of the law than will a single appeal system is unconvincing'.46 At the conclusion of his recent study of 407 cases between 1986 and 1995, Robertson pulls few punches. He claims that the following are 'some salient characteristics of the Law Lords decisions as revealed in the published cases':47 they are very consequentialist in that they are deeply concerned about potential future consequences of their decisions; they rely on Parliament as a long stop; their decisions are commercially pragmatic; they are patronising to other rule appliers (e.g. legal tests will be rejected if they from formal meetings there is a constant dynamic process of discussion about cases before they are heard, during the hearing of the cases, afterwards, at meetings, with reference to drafts circulated, etc. We never seem to stop talking about our cases!' (Wellington, 1995) . 47 Judicial Discretion i n the House of Lords (n. 40 above); the emphasis is ours.
Mode of deliberation
are too complex for, say, medical examiners in social security cases); they have great respect for the decisions of other common law jurisdictions; the Law Lords are consciously incremintalist; they are consciously 'problem solvers' to ensure the smooth running of public administration; and they trust other administrators. Robertson then argues that:48 'In the end these assumptions within which the paradigms are developed are dependent on common, shared, professional expectations which are largely inchoate, and which are quite zrnsuited as the basis of creative law making which shapes our lives. Many have sought a description of judicial ideology, but the truth about their attitudes, in some sense, is that they are not ideological enough! Or at least, they are not ideological in the sense of a developed theory and set of overt assumptions. In the sense of ideology which precisely refers to the largely unconscious expectations of what constitutes normal, rational, decent, responsible behaviour, there is a judicial ideology. It is the ideology of old middle-class men, as the more radical suggestions have it. But they are untypical even of that social category -they have soaked up the ethos of tough minded liberalism of those who run an administrative state.'
In this paper we cannot pursue further the question of the quality of reasoning employed by the Law Lords, save to make the point (again) that there has been no detailed comparison ' of styles of reasoning as between the Law Lords and, say, first level appeal courts.
Composition of the court
Finally, the composition of the top courts may contribute to better quality adjudication. The top courts normally sit as a bench of five (rather than three as in the Court of Appeal in England and Wales). The homely truth that 'five heads are better than three' may not, however, be entirely apt in this context if Robertson is correct in his analysis that 'English judges do not engage with each other intellectually -their positions largely slip past the alternative view with no ~omment'."~ A different view is that quality may be said to arise simply from the fact that the top courts are normally composed of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, judges appointed on criteria which, although not made public, can be assumed to include their abilities to produce judgments of the highest qualities. 
Determining important cases
Nobody envisages that the top courts should deal with trivial matters; on the contrary, of course, a valuable feature often highlighted is that they exist to deal with 'important' cases.
The notion of what constitutes importance in this context is, like much else, curiously underdeveloped. Two main strands can be identified.
First, important cases may be defined in terms of the sums of money at stake in civil claims.
Several of the overseas jurisdictions provide that appeals as of right (i.e. without leave) lie to the Judicial Committee where the value of the dispute exceeds a prescribed amount."
Inflation and the passage of time has, in many jurisdictions, lead to rights of appeal in very modest claims.
Secondly, 'importance' is understood as relating to questions of law that should be considered by a third court. In criminal appeals to the Appellate Committee, leave is conditional o n the court below certifying 'that a point of law of general public importance is I involved in the decision and it appears ... that the point is one that ought to be considered by [the Appellate ~o m m i t t e e ] ' .~~ The precursor of the modern statutory requirement was even more emphatic that a case had to involve 'a point of law of exceptional public importance'." In civil cases, the Appeal Committee's criteria" for granting or refusing leave Alverstone stated that this provision was 'inserted not so much with the object of deciding the particular case before the Court ... but with the object of obtaining the decision of the highest tribunal in the country upon a point of law'.
are not expressly stated:6 and the appeal committee does not give reasons for its leave decisions, but it seems clear that importance of the question of law raised is a significant factor. The same is true of the determination of leave, where required, to appeal to the Judicial Committee.
Choosing 'important' cases
The top courts are, in relation to most of their jurisdiction, in the enviable position of having a wide discretion to choose which cases to hear. Commentators in the past have argued that it would be wrong to constrain that choice by rules or clearly announced m rite ria.'^ Given (now) the general trend to transparency in decision-making, the fact that the top courts are public authorities rationing a scarce resource and the developing notions of rights of access to a court, it is at least open to question whether such an approach continues to be desirable.
But whether or not reasons are disclosed to the parties in particular cases, thought needs to be given to the meaning of 'importance' generally and its implications for the operation of the top courts. While it is obviously true that important questions of law are determined by the top courts, it is equally true that many important questions of law are not determined.
In almost every field of law, there are issues of law which have troubled the Court of Appeal and generated extensive academic comment, but which have not been decided by the Appellate committee." If 'importance' is understood to be a relative rather than an absolute concept, several things follow. First, it means there is no 'magic' total number of appeals which should be determined by the top courts -there is no compelling reason why the top courts must each year hear 50 to 60 appeals a year (as they have in recent years) rather than 30 or 20. In the vast bulk of the appeals heard each year, no profound difficulties would ensue for the legal system, commercial activity or the processes of good governance if the litigation stops at the intermediate court of appeal. Secondly, understanding 'importance' as a relative concept can also possibly mean that the grant and refusal of leave to appeal may properly be constrained by explicit considerations of the resources available to the top 
The importance of the 'generalist court'
One objection to the last suggestion may be that a valuable feature of the top courts is that they are generalist tribunals? and that it would be undesirable for public law issues to crowd out commercial or other types of cases, even if only for (say) five to eight years.
Scholars have devised schemes for the classification of the subject matter of the appeals.63
Attempts to justify the role of second appeals on the basis of the case load subject matter is that the taxonomy ends up being more of a description of the court system as a whole rather than the work of the top courts in particular. For instance, Robertson writes that 'Cases before the Lords, in one way or another, are nearly all about power imbalances. Indeed the traditional notion that the duty of the courts is to protect the weak from the mighty is a guiding theme of this book'.64 He goes on to classify the judgments in his sample period as 'sorting out the details of the corporate economy', 'as the "fine tuner" of the government system', 'the definition of crime', 'as the "fine tuner" of the welfare state' and 'finally, there are cases which seem tremendously important, manifestly involve pressing human demands for justice, but which defy categorisation'. The explanatory power of such analysis is limited. The factors which determine the subject matter of litigation in general are diverse and complex: the economic cycle; natural disasters; political crisises; availability of financial assistance and expertise to pursue litigation; the introduction of new legislative schemes; particular mistakes or scandals. So long as the top courts' formal functions are essentially that of an appellate court, their case load is likely to some extent to reflect litigation further back down the line.
Error correction
Intermediate courts of appeal correct the errors of civil and criminal trial judges in various ways by holding that: evidence was wrongly admitted or excluded; a rule of law was wrongly applied to the facts of a case; a procedural impropriety occurred; the jury were misdirected; (more rarely) judicial discretion wrongly exercised; and so on. Errors occur at first instance because judgments are often unreserved and so made without the benefit of reflection; the issues presented to the court may have lacked refinement;65 judges may be inexperienced. The function of such error correcting is as much, or more, for the benefit of particular litigants than for the good of the legal system as a whole.66
It may be that error correcting of the types just described is also a valuable function carried out by the top courts. A large proportion of appeals heard by the Appellate Committee and the Judicial Committee do result in the reversal of the intermediate appeal courts' judgment not because the Law Lords formulate the law in a different way to the court below, but because they apply it differently to the facts at issue. This said, salutary reminders about the function of appeal courts' in correcting the 'errors' of lower courts have been given by judges. Lord Justice Atkin, addressing Cambridge law students in 1926, concluded a tedious description of appellate court jurisdiction with an interesting point:67
'I will end with a statement of the proportion between successful and unsuccessful appeals, which may be of interest. This proportion seems to be remarkably stable at about 33 per cent. The number of successful appeals from the lower Courts to the Court of Appeal is about 33 per cent of the whole number, and the number of successful appeals from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords is about 33 per cent. There is no reason for believing that if there was a higher tribunal still the proportion of successful appeals to it would not reach at least that figure'. Between Easter 1998 and Easter 1999, eight out of the 63 appeals determined by the Appellate Committee were split 3:2; seven were split 4:l; and 46 were unanimous. There was one Appellate Committee of seven, which was split 6:l. In the Judicial Committee, five of the 50 judgments in that period were split 3:2; one was split 2:l; and one was split 3:l. 
A constitutional court
Courts at the apex of legal systems in most jurisdictions are expected to be 'democracy's refereesf7' -which in essence includes (a) imposing legal constraint on the enactment of legislation by elected parliaments; (b) ensuring that ministers, officials and other public bodies taking executive action do so within the limits of their legal powers; (c) adjudicating on the distribution of powers between national and regional government bodies, and supra- 
System management
A benefit of second appeals may lie in the strategic case-management function of the top courts. Within any legal system, decisions need to be made about which courts, using which procedures, deal with different kinds of legal dispute. Guidance on the allocation and despatch of court business may be provided by statutory provisions, court procedure rules, common law rules, practice directions or case law governing the inherent jurisdiction of courts to regulate their own proceedings. 'System management' intended to facilitate 'joined up justice"04 occurs at all levels of the court structures, but it occupies a considerable proportion of the top courts' work. Examples of the Appellate Committee's function as a manager of the legal system, taken from 1996-99 sample, include: deciding whether challenges should be channelled into the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court or dealt with by criminal c~urts;'~%hether a trial should be allocated to a court martial or the civilian criminal courts;'06 giving guidance to lower courts on the proper approach to take when deciding whether to order a new trial on the grounds that an award of damages was exce~sive;'~~ the powers of county courts to grant adjournment^;'^^ when it is proper to strike out a cause of action because of a claimant's delay;lo9 whether a tort claim may be struck out on the ground that it is not fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care in negligencewhich represents the views of the senior judiciary to government and others), was that there was a continuing need for second level appeals to a court which 'should so far as possible encompass the whole of the United Kingdom'. 102 This is the view of Lord Hope, op cit. and in his written evidence to the Royal Commission (n. 3, above). The point is that if no Scottish appeals were heard by the Appellate Committee, there would be no rationale for the appointment of Scottish Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. or whether such an issue should be determined at trial;"" whether the Appellate Committee had a discretion to hear an appeal which concerned an issue involving a public authority as to a question of public law, even where there was no longer any live issue which would affect the rights and duties of the parties as between themselves;"' whether a non-pecuniary interest in litigation was sufficient automatically to disqualify a person from sitting as a judge in the cause;112 and whether the restriction in section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 on the availability of judicial review on a trial on indictment was aimed at preventing delay to the trial process and whether defendants could challenge the legality of the decision to proceed at trial."3 Doubts about the capacity and appropriateness of the top courts in system management may be raised. A general concern is that this kind of ad hoc regulation is sometimes unsuccessful. Disputes about the allocation of disputes to ordinary civil proceedings or the specialist Order 53 application for judicial review procedure resulted in several House of Lords decisions. Professor Wade commented that this case law 'has produced great uncertainty, which seems likely to continue, as to the boundary between public law and private law since these terms have not clear and settled meaning ... the House of Lords has expounded the new law as designed for the protection of public authorities rather than of the ~itizen'."~ Another concern is whether such litigation in the top courts is an appropriate use of scarce and finite judicial resources;"?ime spent on this activity is time unavailable for other purposes (such as enunciating constitutional values). appeal function) -to possibly amending or establishing new rules. This may make it particularly important that the lead in carrying out this task is taken by the 'top' courtwhich along with the national executive and legislature plays a central role in national policy making.
Innovation also goes beyond the ordering of precedent.117 It concerns moving the law onin the way the Appellate Committee did in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Ass~ciation,"~ by updating a statute's definition of 'family' to accord with their new notions of the family. The case raised the question of whether a same sex partner of a protected tenant could be regarded as a member of the family for the purposes of the Rent Act 1977 and thus had the right to succeed to the tenancy on the death of then original tenant. Lord Slynn acknowledged that the original statutory provisions (which dated back to 1920), read in terms of the times of their passing would not have been understood to include a same sex couple within the definition of 'family'. However, such an interpretation would not be, 'in accordance with contemporary notions of social justice.' This case indicates that the innovation function may entail a degree of leading social change -the alteration to the law made in this case may well have been easier for the Appellate Committee to make than for the government, as recent debate over the repeal of section 28 of the Local Government Act indicates.
The danger for top courts in undertaking this task is that it takes them to the edge of the judicial fun~tion."~ As Sir John Laws has commented, the distribution of authority between the judicial and elective branches in the United Kingdom's constitution is, without a binding constitutional document as a guide, 'ultimately a dynamic settlement ... between the different arms of government. ' The Appellate Committee's decisions may thwart or amend the will of the executive or legislature -or simply be ahead of public opinion. In a case like Fitzpatrick however, it may be argued that this is the sort of legal reform the Appellate Committee is right to take up, on the basis that Parliament may have insufficient time, or may not, for political reasons, either be able to move the law forward for fear of public reaction, or simply want to move the law forward. As to when the Appellate Committee should lead like this -that perhaps is an aspect of the 'dynamic settlement' to which Sir John Laws refers: i.e., it involves an argument on a case by case basis on where the balance lies between Parliament and the courts -there is no conveniently clear boundary between judicial innovation and Parliamentary legislative reform.
Another case in this category involving the updating of the interpretation of old statutory language is R. v 1relandlZ1 which concerned the question whether a recognisable psychiatric illness resulting from malicious telephone calls could amount to 'bodily harm1 in terms of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The Appellate Committee held it could. In contrast to the Fitzpatrick case, R. v Brown makes it clear that judges engaged in this innovatory activity can just as easily find themselves criticised for imposing conservative ideas of sexual morality.'2z Lord Mustill in a dissenting judgment set out an argument against such judicial innovation, principally that it involves the judges trespassing upon the legislative function. Such controversies may, however, simply be about where Laws1 'dynamic balance' is to be struck. The argument about where the balance is to be struck has more frequently been discussed in debates about judicial activism versus judicial restraint.Iz3 This debate has had greater prominence in jurisdictions like the United States, in relation to cases like Roe v Wade.lZ4 The question such cases, and this function, raise for the future is whether the top courts are showing, or in the future will show, less deference towards the executive, and even more crucially, towards the legislature. Whatever the balance might have been, it could be about to change dramatically because cases arising under the Human Rights Act 1998 and devolution Acts will require the courts, and ultimately the top courts, to consider the extent to which statutes or acts of public authorities comply with human rights standards. The directions to the courts (for example, section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998), to always seek to interpret statutes so as to accord with that Act will most likely require the Appellate Committee and Judicial Committee to exhibit more activist behaviour, such as that seen in Fitzpatrick. It will become increasingly important to substantiate the justifications for the top courts questioning the actions of the executive and legislature.
Other reasons for the top court to innovate involve the phenomenon of globalisation and the need to develop domestic law to cope with international legal developments and 0b1igations.l~~ In R. v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendia y Magistrate ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No.
3)lZ6 the House of Lords considered the relationship between developing international law relating to torture and domestic legal rules about whether a former head of state could be immune from prosecution for his actions while head of state. The Pinochet cases presented 12' [I9981 A.C. 147. 122 [I9941 1 A.C. 212 ( homosexual consensual masochistic sex and whether the prosecution in order to succeed had to prove of lack of consent. A majority of 3:2 held it did not, meaning the convictions could stand). 123 The debate has existed here (e.g. Robert Stevens, n. 88 above) but recently has been framed by discussion of the Human Rights Acts 1998 (e. issues in relation to which there were n o clear answers in statute or case law. The credible development of not only United Kingdom law, but also the relationship of international criminal law to United Kingdom law required a n authoritative determination from the highest United Kingdom authority -in this context, the Appellate Committee.
Appellate services for overseas jurisdictions
The Law Lords once confidently exported legal ideas through the binding authority of Judicial Committee advice during the time of the 'imperial
The days of Empire are passed though. The modern Commonwealth is neither the sort of legal order that the European Union is, nor is the Judicial Committee comparable to the European Court of Justice. The Judicial Committee n o longer sits at the heart of a supra-national legal order with the task of maintaining a sense of unity within that order. Comparatively few Commonwealth countries retain the appeal.'" As the Judicial Committee's overseas jurisdiction has waned it has become much less the court of the empire, or Commonwealth, and far more the individual final level of appeal in right of each jurisdiction which still send it appeals.
There are a range of contemporary justifications put forward for the Judicial Committee's 129 overseas' appellate functions. It provides: a second level appeal for legal systems which cannot afford to provide one themselves; a valuable second appeal in legal systems too small to provide their own second level appeal; specialist adjudication in relation to written constitutions and human rights documents.
127 David Swinfen, Imperial Appeal (Manchester, 1987) . 128 See n. 17, above. 129 There is an extensive literature, see e.g. Roger Bryan, 'Toward the development of a Caribbean jurisprudence: the case for establishing a Caribbean Court of Appeal ' (1998) 
Unable t o afford the appeal
The Privy Council office describes the role in this way, '[wlhere once it was a court primarily of the Dominions, now it is a court for the smaller Commonwealth territories who do not have the resources to support a second-tier Court of Appeal of their own."30 This assumes that a second appeal is valuable in itself and that this is in substance what the Judicial Committee provides (i.e. something more than what the first appeal provides). There are problems with this rationale. First, it cannot apply to jurisdictions like New Zealand, or until recently, Hong Kong: they could afford to run their own second level appeal. New Zealand does not keep the appeal for cost reasons, in fact there is a longstanding desire on the part of New Zealand Governments to end the appeal.131 Secondly, it ignores the fact that the Judicial Committee's distance from many of the sending jurisdictions means that coming to it is a substantial cost to litigants. Consequently a good number of litigants are likely to be wealthy, taking cases involving significant amounts of money. They may well be able to pay for local appellate services -providing the Judicial Committee to them, effectively free of cost, is like charity to a millionaire. There are, of course, cases involving poor litigants -notably those applying in forma pauperis. As the split in the Privy Council over the extent to which it should interfere with the workings of local legal systems widens -in death penalty appeals some members ere on the side of a n uncomfortable deference to jurisdictions with the death penalty, while others show a distinct hostility to the death penalty, regardless of the country from which the appeal comes -the benefit of the Privy Council to these litigants may be less than it could be. This matter is discussed further, in the next section.
Insufficient judicial resources
A second justification offered is that the countries concerned cannot afford (in s o far as they d o not have enough judges) to set u p a replacement court of similar calibre a n d that this is The theme of deference not only erodes the historical notion that the Judicial Committee has the task of unifying the common law, but also its ability to be a truly authoritative second level of appeal for foreign jurisdictions. As retention of the appeal is seen by some as detracting from a sense of independence and an adverse comment on the quality of the local judiciary the Privy Council is exercising a particularly sensitive juri~diction. This last comment suggests a court which is attempting to behave in the way second level appeal courts behave in federal systems such as the United States -where the Supreme Court has to deal with conflicts between the federal circuit courts of appeal. Unlike however the United States, the comment also makes clear that the Law Lords would not consider it appropriate, if the New Zealand Court of Appeal wanted to develop New Zealand defamation law along different lines, for them to interfere with that choice. Given that legally Privy Council judgments do still bind New Zealand courts (it is after all the highest court in the New Zealand court hierarchy), the last sentence of the quote is particularly notable -one cannot imagine the Appellate Committee saying the same thing to, for example the English Court of Appeal.
This advantage of being a small group of very senior judges may also be offset by the Judicial Committee's sheer distance from some jurisdictions, especially when dealing with matters involving significant local cultural sensitivities. New Zealand Treaty of Waitangi cases frequently raise this point. Tainz~i Maori Trust Board v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries omm mission'^^ arose from the introduction in 1986 of a quota management system for the allocation of resources in New Zealand's fisheries. After Maori had claimed that the system had implications for their proprietary rights under the Treaty of Waitangi there were negotiations with the government which resulted in a deed of settlement (which was associated with other litigation in relation to the scheme). The Deed of Settlement was given effect to in the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. The consolidated appeals in this case concerned the allocation of fisheries assets to iwi and whether iwi may include urban Maori -a question involving very specific cultural knowledge. Their Lordships note they were:
'Very conscious of the important role played by the Courts of New Zealand, and by the Court of Appeal in particular, in relation to claims by Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi; and they fully realise the depth of knowledge and experience of the Court of Appeal in this area.'I4" They nevertheless allowed the appeal.
There are points of more serious tension within the Privy Council itself, especially in relation to death penalty cases, which run against the theme of deference. In death penalty cases some of their Lordships clearly want to take a more 'global' approach and be rather more innovative in their approach to these cases. 10 of 1997, another case arising from the quota management system for New Zealand's fisheries. Peng Aun Lim concerned the inter-relation between the operation of the quota system with a commercial transaction -an agreement to share quota allocation in a partnership. '4"1997] (Edinburgh, 1991) 152 That is cases involving in particular the interpretation of written constitutions, or in the exceptional case of New Zealand, which has a largely uncodified constitution along UK lines, cases of constitutional significance, e.g. involving interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi.
for the Law Lords to develop overarching or deeper themes in relation to the constitutional development of the jurisdictions they are dealing with; and in relation to death penalty cases, the Committee is increasingly split.
Cases of note include Thonzas v Commissioner of ~r i s o n s '~~, a majority decision on whether
there was a constitutional right of a prisoner sentenced to death to have his application to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights considered and determined before sentence was carried out, and whether the way a prisoner is treated prior to carrying out sentence could render the sentence unconstitutional. The case is also notable because the Board split in three directions, with a majority judgment and two dissents. De whether failure to appoint a constituent boundaries commission within a reasonable time of a census was a condition precedent to a valid election. The Judicial Committee held that while a commission had to be established within a reasonable time, and if failure to do so were challenged before an election, relief would be ranted, after an election has been held, relief was discretionary. In this case relief was refused.
Professional regulation and ecclesiastical matters
The oddest aspect of top courts' work is that the Judicial Committee hears appeals from a variety of professional disciplinary bodies and in the period examined, one lengthy case about the structure of a parish'". This is straight forward appellate work -indeed, the Judicial Committee is the first and only appeal. The cases mostly concern doctors in trouble for psychiatric illness, dishonesty or incompetence. Due to, among other things, changes in the General Medical Council's disciplinary practices, the number of cases coming to the Judicial Committee under this heading is increasing. Although the Committee only sits with three judges for these cases, and for relatively short periods of hearing time (about half to one day) these cases are still a demand on the top courts' key resource -the judges' time. Of all the functions of the top courts discussed in this paper, this one should certainly be moved elsewhere -there is no good reason for a second level appeal court to be carrying out first level appeal work.
153 Case 13 of 1999,17 March 1999 (Trinidad and Tobago) . 
IV. Concluding remarks
We have argued that the current work, shared resources and future reform of the Appellate Committee and Judicial Committee are too intertwined to be considered in isolation from one and other. The formal function of the top courts is, and is likely to continue to be, that of hearing second appeals. The value of that basic function and the detail of what that function entails is, as we have shown, far from straightforward or uncontentious. The problems faced by the Appellate Committee and Judicial Committee are not however unique -top level appellate courts around the world are also, coping with: an increasing demands on court time as case loads increase; questions about the legitimacy of the courts' role in restraining executive and legislative action by judicial review; and role of the courts engaging in significant innovation;'" and new expectations arising from the passage of new legislative or constitutional provisions.'59 While these courts operate in the context of their own legal systems there may be lessons to be learnt from examining both the functions they share with the United Kingdom's top courts (and how they undertake them) and, where there are differences, why other legal systems distribute the functions allocated in the United Kingdom to the top courts, to other bodies within the legal system.'60 158 e.g. Mabo v Queensland (1989) 166 C.L.R. 186, in which the High Court found that Australia was not terra nullius when European settlers first arrived. 159 e.g. in Canada, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; in New Zealand, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; in Spain, the post-Franco Constitution; or generally in Europe, the interaction of Community Law and the European Convention on Human Rights with the legal systems of member states. Ih(l We are conducting an conducting a comparative study, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and British Academy, into the top courts of Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain and the USA with the aim of developing a detailed and costed outline for a new structure for the UK's top courts-including analysis of the choice between a single supreme court, or a supreme court accompanied by a separate constitutional court.
VI. Appendix
The following statistics have been compiled using each judgment handed down by the Appellate Committee and the Judicial Committee during the period November 1996 to November 1999. As a result the statistics differ from those published by the Lord Chancellor's Department as they do not take into account those appeals that are, for example, disposed of without a judgment (The Lord Chancellor's Department statistics stated that 17 cases were disposed of by the House of Lords without a judgment being given in 1998 alone (Judicial Statistics 1998, Cm. 4371). November  1999 shows the various outcomes of the 166 appeals determined by the Appellate Committee during the study period, along with statistics as to the court appealed from. The figures show that the Appellate Committee dealt predominantly with matters arising in the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal, and that the Law Lords determined 152 'civil' cases during the study period. Perhaps more surprising however, is the relatively small number of 'criminal' cases dealt with: despite deciding 9 criminal appeals during 1997, the Appellate Committee only determined 14 such appeals during the whole study period. Also surprising perhaps, is the seemingly high success rate throughout the period, however it must be remembered that due to cases which were dismissed without judgment being excluded from this study, this figure may be disproportionately high. Table 2 : Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, cases determined November 1996 -November 1999 provides a summary of the 193 cases determined by the Judicial Committee during the study period. The table also shows the origins of the appeals (although it must be remembered that the right of appeal from both Hong Kong and the Gambia ended during the study period). The table does display the high proportion of criminal appeals dealt with by the Judicial Committee: roughly one third of the total number during the three year sample. In addition it should be noted that more than half of the appeals determined between 1996 and 1999 came from only four countries: Hong Kong, Jamaica, New Zealand, and Trinidad and Tobago. This is interesting bearing in mind that the appeal from Hong Kong ended mid-way through the study period. 
